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This paper investigates the question of wage inequality in Indian manufacturing in the 
years of trade and investment liberalization. The objective is to test the hypothesis of 
skill biased technological change (SBTC) due to capital-skill complementarity and the 
impact of labour regulations on wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour. 
The skill-wage bill share equation is estimated for a panel of 46 three-digit industries 
spanning the period 1981-2004 followed by 113 four-digit industries panel covering 
the period 1993 to 2004.The econometric results suggest the positive contribution of 
change in output (scale effect), capital-output ratio and contract-worker intensity to 
wage inequality in Indian manufacturing. 
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Wage Inequality in Indian Manufacturing: 
Is it Trade, Technology or Labour Regulations? 
K.V.Ramaswamy 
I. Introduction: 
Studies of globalization and wage inequality in developing countries consistently 
point to an increase in inequality (Goldberg and Pavenik, 2007). This contradicts the 
conventional wisdom that predicts favourable effects of trade exposure on demand for 
unskilled labour. According to the conventional wisdom based on Hecksher-Ohlin 
and Stolper-Samuelson theory (H-O-S), trade induced increase in the price of 
unskilled intensive (exported) products should increase the wages of unskilled 
workers and the expected decrease in the price of skilled labour intensive (imported) 
products should lead to a decline in wages of skilled workers. Empirical evidence has 
turned against this benign prediction and drawn attention to the alternative 
mechanisms through which trade openness affected wage inequality. The increase in 
skill premium (skill-unskilled wage differential) driven by an increase in the demand 
for skilled workers has been identified as the key factor contributing to rising 
inequality. What are the factors that have caused an increase in the relative demand 
for skilled workers in developing countries?  First factor in the list is new technology 
that flows in from industrialized countries through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and import of advanced capital goods. The technology that originates in the developed 
countries is assumed to be skill-biased or unskilled–labour saving as they are not 
unskilled-labour abundant economies
2. Inflow of skill-biased technology can induce 
increases in the relative productivity of skilled-labour raising relative demand and 
                                                 
2 SBTC argument was proposed in the industrialized country (read the US) context as 
an alternative channel for rising wage inequality as against trade with low-wage 
countries. Therefore, it emphasized technological innovations, use of computers and 
R&D investment.    4 
 
wages for skilled labour increasing wage inequality. Robbins (1996) called this source 
of wage inequality generation following trade liberalization as ‘skill-enhancing trade 
hypothesis’.  Second factor is trade in intermediate goods. It is argued that if traded 
goods are inputs into further production, unlike the H-O theory that assumes traded 
goods are final goods, the implications of trade on inequality would be different 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996,1997 and 2001). The production of final goods can be 
split into intermediate stages and that intermediate inputs differ in their skill 
intensities. As a result, firms find it optimal to “”outsource” some of the production 
stages to cost-minimizing locations in developing countries. The products shifted to 
developing countries, through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), that would be 
unskilled-labour intensive in a developed country turn out to be skilled-labour-
intensive in a developing country when compared with its existing production 
activities. In brief, outsourcing or slicing up of the value chain is likely to increase the 
average skill intensity of production in developing countries. Using this insight, Zhu 
and Trefler (2005) argue that technological catch-up (more broadly defined than mere 
greater use of physical capital) in the developing countries results in a shift in favour 
of skill intensive exports (that is skill-intensive relative to developing country 
endowments) and this raises the demand for skill and wage inequality.
3 Third possible 
factor is the ‘defensive innovations’ strategy of developing country firms in response 
to import competition due to trade openness (Wood 1995). The threat of external 
                                                 
3 It is also argued that trade reforms in developing countries leads to an increase in 
capital inflows and this may require greater use of skilled labour, if capital and skilled 
labour are complementary (Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekey, 2000). This is similar to 
Feenstra and Hanson argument. A lower price of intermediate inputs (capital goods) 
would shift the demand for other inputs, increasing that of complementary production 
factors and reducing the demand for substitutes. If unskilled labour were more 
substitutable for intermediate goods than skilled labour, cheaper intermediate goods 
would increase the relative demand for skills within industries raising the skill 
premium   5 
 
competition could induce an increase in R&D or incentive to adopt new technologies 
that was absent under trade protection. By implication incentive to adopt skill-biased 
technologies would greater in those industries that are subject to relatively large tariff 
cuts. Fourth mechanism is suggested buy the model of endogenous technological 
change (Acemoglu 2003). In this model increasing supply of skilled labour in the US 
induces SBTC through the market-size effect. That is greater demand for skill-
intensive goods by consumers (educated labour) increasing the profitability of skill-
intensive goods, thus encouraging SBTC. The Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are 
technology followers that use the US technology. In other words, the drivers of 
technological change in developing countries may be embodied in ‘imported capital 
good’, for example, machines, office equipment and other capital goods that are 
complementary to skilled labour. Trade liberalization affects the demand for skilled 
labour by reducing the relative price of these capital goods and increasing their 
imports. SBTC may be an endogenous response to trade openness. In other words, 
instead of trade-openness and SBTC as alternative explanations of increasing wage 
inequality, globalization is indirectly held as the source of observed inequality. 
Domestic institutions like the Job Security Regulations (JSR) is also argued to 
be important as a determinant of industry performance like productivity, profits and 
employment during economic liberalization (Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zillbotti, 
2005). The impact on wage inequality in the presence of restrictive domestic 
institutional rules has not been addressed
4. Domestic labour regulations could restrict 
firm ability to adjust skill mix in response to trade openness. The JSR may be defined 
to include all those legal provisions that increase the cost of workforce adjustment by 
                                                 
4 Aghion et al (2003) point out that restrictive domestic regulations will have adverse 
distributional consequences but do not attempt empirical estimation of income 
distribution effects in their paper.   6 
 
retrenchment of workers. They are supposed to constrain adjustment response of firms 
to competitive conditions and inhibit firing decisions (labour market inflexibility). 
Firms are reported to have responded by hiring more temporary or contract workers 
and outsourcing production to firms in the informal sector (Ramaswamy 1999, 2003). 
Firms will have an incentive to set up a dual structure within the firm by employing 
unskilled-contract workers (so called tier-II workers, who could be fired without cost) 
instead of unskilled-regular workers. Restriction on firing is not applicable to 
skilled/managerial/supervisory personnel. I had observed in my earlier study large 
firms with above 300 workers employ a larger share of both contract workers and 
managers (Ramaswamy 2006). Labour regulations perhaps induce substitution of 
skilled workers for unskilled workers raising skill premium
5. This can be easily 
explained. Assume that JSR raises the expected cost of hiring regular workers then the 
firms has incentive to increase the fraction of skilled workers employed at each level 
of production
6.      
Disentangling the effects of different factors has turned out to be a challenge 
and the empirical evidence is mixed and inconclusive. In the Indian context, two 
studies have used the individual worker wage-premium approach to measure the 
impact of trade liberalization. Dutta (2004) finds a positive relationship between inter-
industry wage premium and tariffs. This suggests that trade liberalization has 
accentuated wage inequalities. Using similar methodologies, Kumar and Mishra 
(2008) report a negative relationship wage-premium and tariffs leading to the 
argument that trade reforms in India has reduced skill-wage premium and wage 
inequalities. In contrast, Berman, Somanathan and Tan (2005) investigate whether 
                                                 
5 Currie and Harrison (1997) had observed the employment of temporary workers to 
increase in Morocco in response to trade liberalization. 
6 Recall skilled and unskilled labour are substitutes.   7 
 
SBTC has taken place in India after the trade reforms in the 1990s using data on 
industry level skill wage-bill shares. Their analysis covers the period 1984-1998 and 
uses the method of OLS on period averages of 76 three-digit manufacturing industries 
based on Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). They estimate cross-sectional variation 
in growth rates of skill-wage shares in two sub-periods, namely, 1984-1989 (pre-
reform) and 1990-1998 (post-reform). Data on two sub-periods are pooled and time 
dummies are introduced to account for post-reform change in skill-wage shares. They 
find that the skill wage-bill share accelerated in the 1990s but the change in capital-
skill complementarity alone explained very little of the acceleration. Output growth 
explained about half of the acceleration in wage-bill share in the 1990s suggesting 
that fast growing industries are upgrading their skill mix faster than slow growing 
industries. Comparing the estimates for India with the comparable estimates for the 
US (Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994) Berman et al suggest that capital-skill 
complementarity in Indian manufacturing increased in the 1990s to a level 
comparable to the US level in the 1960s and 1970s (Berman et al 2005, page 32).  
Overall they interpreted their results as providing some evidence of SBTC but largely 
uncertain
7. Their estimates of capital-skill complementarity seem to be an 
overestimate as the two contributory factors, namely FDI inflows into Indian 
manufacturing and the import of capital goods (machinery) as percent of fixed capital 
formation experienced a sharp upturn only after 1997-98, the last year of their study. 
Further, their method focuses on aggregate effects using weighted average of change 
in skill-wage shares and does not address situations of industry specific heterogeneity 
                                                 
7 They are cautious in their interpretation and do point out that the role of SBTC is 
uncertain due to several other factors. One of them is that the set of Indian industries 
undergoing skill upgrading does not match the international pattern of the US or the 
middle-income countries.    8 
 
unobserved by the econometrician. Third, their analysis does not consider any 
institutional variable that may impact wage inequalities.  
  The present study following the similar framework in the tradition of Berman, 
Bound and Griliches (1994), Berman and Machin (2000) and Berman et al (2005), 
attempts an empirical examination of the problem of wage inequality in Indian 
manufacturing industries. I focus on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers. The skill wage gap refers to the wage differential between production (blue-
collar) and non-manual (white-collar) workers reported in the annual survey of 
manufacturing factories in India. The manufacturing survey data unlike the household 
surveys do not give data on education level of the workers. However, the non-
production workers are categorized as those in the supervisory and managerial level 
indicating higher educational attainment. International evidence indicates a close 
relationship between the production/non-manual status of workers and their education 
level (Goldberg and Pavenik 2007).
8. Therefore, the wage gap between manual and 
non-manual worker is considered as suitable for analyzing the impact of globalization 
on wage inequality. An added advantage is the availability of data on capital stock 
and investment that would be absent in household survey data, enabling a direct test 
of capital-skill complementarity hypothesis. In this paper I provide evidence of 
increasing wage-gap between skilled and unskilled gap in Indian manufacturing in the 
years since trade and investment liberalization. These years may be characterized as 
years of ‘catching-up’ and ‘upgrading’ of Indian industry. I make two specific 
contributions. First I show that skill-wage inequality has risen across industries 
encompassing both import-competing and export-oriented industries. Second I utilize 
panel data to estimate skill-wage share equations using time differencing and fixed 
                                                 
8 Evidence from household survey in India suggests an increasing return to education 
in recent years   9 
 
effect models that control for unobserved industry specific heterogeneity. My estimate 
of skill-wage share equation shows a statistically significant impact of change in scale 
of output (scale-upgrading) and capital-skill complementarity on skill-wage shares, 
the two skilled-labor demand shifters suggested in the literature. Some indirect 
evidence of the impact of restrictive labour regulations is also provided.  To begin 
with I will report the results from a panel of 46 3-digit industries covering the period 
1981 to 2004. This uses a consistent data series based on NIC-1998.Then I will 
present results based on a panel of 113 4-digit industries between 1993 and 2004.    
II. Policy Reform and Background Facts: 
Trade and Investment Liberalization 
 
India liberalized its trade and foreign investment policies beginning in July 1991.The 
major areas of reform included the removal of reduction of tariff levels and their 
dispersion, the removal of licensing and other non-tariff barriers on all imports of 
intermediate and capital goods, the elimination of trade monopolies of the state 
trading agencies and the simplification of trading regime. The mean tariff was 
reduced from 128% before July 1991 to 94% in February 1992 55% in February 1994 
and to 35% by 1997-98 (Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy, 2007). Later it was reduced 
to 30 percent in 2001. The share of products subject to quantitative restrictions 
decreased from 87 percent in 1987/88 to 45 percent 94/95. However, 95 percent of the 
tariff lines were freed from Non Tariff barriers (NTBs) in 2001. Restrictions on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) were relaxed in 1991. In the years prior to 1991, FDI 
was permitted only up to 40 percent in certain industries, known as ‘Appendix I 
Industries’ subject to the discretionary approval by the government. In 1991, FDI was 
allowed up to 51 percent equity in these industries under the ‘automatic route’. This 
was later liberalized to enable setting up of 100 percent subsidiaries in the   10 
 
manufacturing sector in 1997. In absolute terms, manufactured exports have reached 
close to $ 50 billion in 2004 compared to $24 billion in 1996. The structure of exports 
has undergone changes during this period in favour of relatively skilled-labour 
intensive products (Ramaswamy, 2006). Two key product groups that have emerged 
as prominent are engineering goods and chemicals that include drugs and 
pharmaceuticals.  Engineering goods include passenger cars and automotive 
components. Liberalization of capacity licensing and entry regulations for large 
domestic and foreign firms led to high rates of capital formation in ‘import 
competing’ industries like consumer durables. India further liberalized the access to 
foreign technology in the 1990s.Royalty payment by all companies with foreign 
technology collaboration agreements is permitted without any restriction on the extent 
of foreign equity participation. In brief following economic liberalization in the 1990s 
Indian manufacturing industry has greater access to capital and intermediate goods 
and technology. This provided incentive for technological upgrading and 
modernization of manufacturing industries. How has trade and investment openness 
impacted the inequality in wages between skilled and unskilled labour is the focus of 
this paper.  
Background Facts: 
What has been the aggregate trend in employment share of skilled-labour in Indian 
manufacturing in recent years? Figure 1 shows that skilled-labour share (share of non-
manual employees in total employment) has increased continuously in the 1990s. 
Leaving out the year 1998-99 that shows an abnormal rise, the trend is clearly in 
favour of employment of skilled-labor.  The years since 1991 as we noted earlier are 
years of trade and investment liberalization. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Indian manufacturing showed a rising but fluctuating trend since 1995-96 (Figure 2).   11 
 
In absolute terms FDI into Indian manufacturing is estimated to be more than $US 12 
billion since 1992-93
9. Import of machinery and equipment by India has risen sharply 
since 1998-99 (Figure 3)
10. This is reflected in the share of imported capital goods as 
percent of fixed capital formation in manufacturing (Table-1). Consistent with this the 
capital-output ratio has gone up across industry groups encompassing both export-
oriented and import-competing industries (Figure-4). I have followed Ghose (2000) in 
classifying three-digit industries into import-competing and export-oriented categories 
(Ramaswamy, 2006). Relative wages of skilled-labour (ratio of wages per non-manual 
employee to wages per worker) or the skill premium has increased through out the 
1990s particularly after 1997-98. (Figure-5). The rise in skill premium has taken place 
both in export-oriented and import-competing industries. As shown in Figure-6, the 
increase in relative wages of skilled-labour in the 1990s is accompanied by an 
increase in the share of skilled-workers in total employment. This suggests an 
aggregate demand shift in favour of skilled-workers represented by the share of non-
manual employees in total employment
11.  Another key statistic in this context is the 
share of contract workers in total manual workers  (Figure 7)
12. This indicates an 
increase in the share of workers not subject to job security and severance payment 
rules under Indian labour laws (Ramaswamy 2006). 
                                                 
9 FDI data is based on Government of India(2002) and updated using the Annual 
Reports of the Reserve  Bank of India for the years 2001 to 2005. 
10 The source of data for machinery imports is the India-stat data base available at 
http://www.Indiastat.com. Import data excludes import of project goods and metals.   
11 Figures 5 to 7 are based on selected set of 46 three-digit industries having 
continuous time-series data since 1980-81 after using the concordance tables 
(EPWRF, 2007).  
12 Data on contract workers is based on Annual Survey of Industries, Summary 
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III. Analytical Framework and Data: 
The key empirical development reported in many developing countries has been the 
increase in the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages (Ws/Wu=relative price of labour) 
accompanied by a rising ratio skilled to unskilled employment (Ls/Lu= relative 
quantity of employment). This suggests an outward shift in the relative demand curve 
for skilled labour. What has caused this shift in relative demand for skill? One school 
of thought attributes this shift to skill-biased technological change (SBTC). SBTC 
improves the relative productivity of skilled labour within industries and firms within 
industries causing their wages to go up. A straightforward test of this proposition is to 
examine whether the aggregate skilled-unskilled wage ratios have gone up due to 
increase in wage gaps within industries or due to greater expansion of skilled-labour 
intensive industries raising their share in aggregate employment. It is important to 
recall that according to the traditional approach of H-O-S theory, trade affects labour 
by a process of inter-industry allocation. As relative output prices change due to 
openness relative factor demand change inducing re-allocation of labour. Trade 
impacts labour markets in developing countries by shifting the derived demand for 
labour between industries from those intensive in skilled labour to those intensive in 
unskilled labour. Many empirical studies have used simple decomposition exercise 
that decomposes the increase in the skill-wage fraction of total wage bill into shifts 
that occur within and between industries as an important indicator of sources of 
change in labour demand (Berman, Bound and Griliches 1994, Berman and Machin 
2000).  
A standards method is to estimate the following decomposition formula for a change 
in S (wage-bill share of skilled-labour) in industries i….n.   
             ΔSt= Si - Sτ  = ∑ Δ sit .Ei + ∑ Δ Eit. si   17 
 
Where, Eit is the share of industry i’s employment in total employment at time t, sit is 
the share of skilled-labour wage-bill in total wage-bill in industry i,  
Ei = ½(Eit +Eiτ) and   si = ½ (sit +siτ) 
 The first term on the RHS represents the within industry change as weighted sum of 
change in skill-wage shares within industries with weights given by mean 
employment shares measuring the relative importance of each industry in the 
aggregate and the second term represents the between industry change, attributing the 
skill-wage share to changes in the employment shares of different industries. If the 
proportion of total change in skill-wage-bill share (S) is dominated by within industry 
change then it is taken as evidence in support of SBTC. However, one needs to 
recognize that other factors could also possibly cause within industry change in S as 
pointed out by others (Feenstra 2003).    
  The within-industry variation in skill-wage shares is further analyzed using an 
econometric approach (Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994). The econometric 
approach is based on the quasi-fixed cost function approach to factor demand. The 
cost function is used to derive equations for shares of skilled and unskilled labour 
payments in total factor payments for all variable factors assuming that some of the 
inputs are fixed and the quantities of variable inputs are chosen to minimize costs. 
Consider the variable cost function, in two variable inputs, namely, skilled-labour and 
unskilled-labour with capital and output considered as fixed: 
C= f (Ws, Wu, K, Q)     (1) 
Where C is total variable cost, Ws and Wu are the prices of variable inputs, namely, 
skilled and unskilled labour, K is the stock of plant and equipment and Q is real 
output. 
   18 
 
The equation in (1) is assumed to take the translog function:  
lnC= α0 + βs ln (Ws) + βu ln (Wu) + βq ln (Q) + βk ln (K)+ ½ {βsu ln (Ws) ln 
(Wu) + βss ln (Ws)
2 + βus ln (Wu) ln (Ws) + βuu ln (Wu)
2}
 + ½ {βqq ln (Q)
2  + βkk 
ln (K)
2 } +
 βqs ln (Q) ln (Ws) + βqu ln (Q) ln (Wu) + βks ln (K)ln (Ws)+ + 
βkuln(K) ln (Wu) + λln (K) ln (Q) +  є                                              (2) 
Where є is the disturbance term. Shephard’s lemma implies the following necessary 
condition for cost-minimization
13: 
ə lnC/ə lnWi  = Si     (i = s, u)               (3) 
Where Si  = share of ith factor input in total variable cost. Differentiating (2) with 
respect to ln (Wi), imposing the standard restrictions of symmetry and homogeneity of 
degree one in prices, and using the equilibrium condition (3), I obtain the cost share 
equation for each factor
14. The wage-bill share equation for skilled-labour can be 
written as:  
            Ss = α + β1 ln (Ws/Wu) + β2 ln (K/Q) + β3 ln (Q) + є   (4) 
If  β2  >0, then capital is complementary to skilled-labour. The scale effect of 
production operations is measured by β3. If relative factor demand is independent of 
scale at each relative factor price ratio, then β3 =0 otherwise β3 >0
15.  Note that the 
estimation of equation (4) is based on several assumptions. First, it is assumed that 
                                                 
13 Note that əlnC/əlnWi = əC/əWi.Wi/C = Wi.Ei/C=Si. Where ΣWiEi =C. And ΣSi=1. 
The cost shares sum to one. 
14  The cost share equations take the following form: 
      Si = αi + βqi ln (Q) + Σj βij ln Wj + βki ln (K) 
Given that ΣSi=1 and the symmetry and homogeneity restrictions, only one of the two    
share equations required to be estimated. The parameters of the remaining equation 
can be retrieved from the parameters of the estimated equation. Using the restrictions 
and the constant returns to scale assumption of one can write the skill-wage share 
equation for econometric estimation as in equation (4 in the text. See Berman et al 
(1993)         
15 If the production function is non-homogenous then optimal factor-proportion is 
function of relative factor prices as well as the level of output. See Hamermesh (2000) 
page 32.   19 
 
capital and value added can be treated as variables not affected by the current-wage 
share skilled-labour. Second, the R.H.S of the estimating equation includes a term that 
is a ratio of relative wage (Ws/Wu). However, it is pointed out that the price of 
quality-adjusted skilled-labour and unskilled-labour does not differ between 
industries. Once the wages are adjusted for quality then over-time, the change in 
relative wage will be a constant. Further, given the relationship between the 
dependent variable (Ss=Ws/ΣWi) and the wages per skilled worker (Ws/Es), estimates 
are likely to suffer from spurious correlation. Following this the relative wage term ln 
(Ws/Wu) is dropped from equation (4). This yields the actual panel estimation 
equation: 
          Sit = α + β1 ln (Kit /Qit)  + β2 ln (Qit) + δYt + λi + εit       (5) 
Where, Sit is the wage bill share of skilled-labour in industry i in year t, ln (Kit /Qit) is 
the log of capital to output ratio in industry i in year t and ln (Qit) is the output level in 
industry i in year t, Y represents YEAR dummies and λi is the industry-specific effect 
and  
εit is a white noise error term. The variable λi captures all unobserved time-constant 
industry-specific factors that affect Sit (unobserved by the econometrician). Yt 
captures shocks to Sit that vary over time. It is often useful to weight the observations 
used to estimate equation (5) by the share of each industry’s wage-bill in total 
manufacturing wage-bill. I do follow this practice such that large industries receive 
more weight in the regression.   
Equation (5) can be estimated using both the fixed effects (FE) and time 
differencing (TD). They are alternative methods for controlling unobserved 
heterogeneity. I focus on TD with longer time differences like eight-year and six-year 
differences of the underlying data. By taking differences over a relatively long period,   20 
 
I am in effect allowing industries (firms) to have reasonable time to adjust skilled 
labour demand to a given shock. The long difference estimators are shown to be less 
sensitive to measurement errors than the fixed effects estimator (Griliches and 
Hausman 1986; Westbrook and Tybout 1993). For purposes of comparison I do 
present the FE estimates for the three-period panel of 4-digit industries. The 
econometric issue of correlation between the error term and the explanatory variables, 
say value added, may still be a matter of concern. The use of time differencing and 
year dummies should largely alleviate the problem. Other variables of direct interest 
like the import penetration ratio and indicators of labour regulation can be introduced 
into the regression equation (5).    
Data: 
The 3-digit and 4-digit industry level data is based on the published results of the 
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) that covers all registered factories with more than 
10 workers (ASI-EPW 2007 Volume-II). India’s National Industrial Classification 
(NIC) changed in 1989-90 and 1998-99. ASI-EPW volume II presents a consistent 
series based on NIC-1998 at the 2-digit and 3-digit level of aggregation. I use the data 
for 46 3-digit industries for which consistent data is available covering the period 
1981-82 to 2003-04. Then I update the series using the ASI factory sector results for 
the year 2004-05. More detailed data on employment and wages is published in the 
published volumes of the ASI-factory sector results that present data at both 3-digit 
and 4-digit level
16. This is available for only selected years. I have constructed the 
data on output, employment and wages for 3 selected years at the 4-digit level for 
1993-94, 1998-99 and 2004-05 using the concordance tables to convert NIC-1987 (for 
1993-94) into NIC-1998 such that I can estimate regression (3) based on three time 
                                                 
16 Annual Survey of Industries 2004-2005, Factory Sector, Summary Results,  
    Volume-I, Central Statistical Organization, New Delhi   21 
 
periods. For these 3 years I have used the UNIDO demand and supply data base  
(UNIDO, 2008) to estimate trade data by industry (exports and imports) based on 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC-revision-3) that is consistent 
with NIC-1998. This study will cover the period 1981 to 2004. This will have two 
important advantages:(1) this period includes the years in which FDI inflow into 
Indian manufacturing underwent a structural break. Imports of machinery and capital 
goods by the Indian manufacturing firms substantially increased (2) this longer time-
span that enables me to use long differencing in terms of 4-year or more than 4-years. 
Output is measured by gross value added deflated by industry-specific prices based on 
the Whole-sale Price Index (WPI) for manufactures with the base year 1993-
94.Capital by the gross value of fixed assets deflated by price index of machinery at 
1993-94 prices. The price index of machinery is weighted average of electrical and 
non-electrical machinery price indices
17. The other variables are defined as follows:  
Wage-bill-Share of Skilled Workers =(Total Wage-bill minus Wage-bill of Workers) / (Total Wage-
bill) Employment share of Skilled Workers = (Total Employees minus Total  Production 
Workers)/(Total Employees) 
The ASI reports the total number of employees and total persons engaged separately 
till 1997-98 at the 3-digit level. The latter includes unpaid family workers and owner-
proprietors and ‘others’ not directly engaged in production activity. Since 1998-99 
only the total persons engaged are reported for 3-digit industries. However, since 
2001-02 the ASI published reports provide the figures for number of employees and 
persons engaged separately. A careful examination of the data for the years 2001 and 
2002 revealed that employment share of category “Unpaid family 
members/proprietors etc” is less than one percent of the total employment (all 
                                                 
17  The source of data for WPI is the India-stat data base available at 
http://www.indiastat.com   22 
 
industries). This implies an insignificant share at the level of individual industries. 
Therefore, for the period 1998-99 to 2004-2005, at the 3-digit level total persons 
engaged is taken as an estimate of total employees. Total emoluments paid out (our 
estimate of Total Wage-bill) includes bonus paid in addition to wages. Total wages 
paid for workers excludes bonus. This overestimates the wage-bill of skilled workers. 
Bonus is estimated to constitute about 9%-10% of total emoluments with hardly much 
variation over the period under study. Therefore this should not pose serious problems 
for my study. Further this problem disappears at the 4-digit level as bonus is excluded 
in the data on wages paid out to workers and other employees available in the 
published volumes cited above for the years 1998-99 to 2004-05. The explanatory 
variables include variables that will capture the capital-skill complentarity effect, 
scale effect, import competition effect and labour regulation effect. The econometric 
analysis will be preceded by decomposition analysis of wage inequalities. The 
decomposition analysis will investigate the within- and between effects of skilled and 
unskilled wage-bill ratio in the selected set of 46 three-digit industries.  
 
IV Results  
The results of decomposition of skill-wage share change for different time periods are 
presented in Table-2.  In the pre-reform period of 1981-89 the skill-wage share 
declined by 0.08 percentage points per year. In the two post-reform sub-periods, it 
increased by 0.37 percentage points per year. The proportion of the total change in 
skill-wage share is accounted for by “within” industry changes in all the three periods 
under consideration. In other words, the skill-wage share change is driven by within 
industry change as the between industry allocations are insignificant. This supports 
the proposition of SBTC. A shortcoming of the decomposition approach is that the   23 
 
measurement of the within-industry is component is sensitive to the level of 
aggregation used in the analysis. At each level of industry aggregation the mix of 
constituent heterogeneous industries with different skill-intensities will vary. As a 
result the decomposition may fail to pick up the within industry effects that could be 
taking place within more disaggregated industries, say, within 4-digit industry in a 3-
digit level analysis. 
 
Table-2:  Decomposition of Δ Share of Skilled-Labour in Wage-bill 
  1981-89 1991-98 1998-2004 
Δ Skill-Wage Share x 100*  -0.08  0.37  0.37 
Within Industry (%)**  123.7  116.5  110.4 
* Based on 46 3-digit industries in the ASI. Average annual change for the 
over the relevant period. 
* Percentage “within” is the percentage of the change due to increases 
within industry following the decomposition formula in the text.   
 
  In Table 3 the results of OLS estimation of equation 3 for a set of 46 three-
digit industries is presented. The regression estimates in the first column represent the 
pre-reform period, that is, 1981-1989. This is a two-period panel data with a time 
difference of 8 years. This is followed by followed by three-period (8-year and 7-year 
differences) and four-period (8-year, 7-year, and 6-year differences) panel data 
estimates in the third and fourth columns. Estimate for the pre-reform period (column 
1) indicates the decline in skill-wage share, as the constant term is negative and 
significant. The coefficients of log output-change is weakly significant and the log of 
change in capital-output ratio is insignificant. R-square is very low (0.02) and not 
significant. This supports the hypothesis of absence of SBTC in the pre-reform period. 
In contrast, the estimates of coefficients of output and capital-output in column 2 and 
3 are statistically significant, after allowing for secular change (captured by time   24 
 
dummies-estimates are not shown) and unobserved industry-specific heterogeneity. 
We may recall that time differencing has been used to sweep out the time-constant 
industry specific factors impacting the wage share of skilled-labour. R -square is 
significant in both panels
18. These results support the hypothesis of SBTC due to 
capital-skill complementarity in production captured by increasing capital-output 
ratio. The significant output change coefficient indicates that skilled-unskilled ratio is 
positively related scale of output. My estimates of capital-skill complementarity based 
on 3-digit industries are directly comparable with that of Berman et al (Berman et al 
2005). My results for the pre-reform period are similar. However, my estimate (0.123) 
for the period 1981-1998 seems to be substantially higher than their estimate (0.04) 
for 1990-1998 (0.04, Berman et al (2005), Table 8,page 25). 
 
However my estimate using three period panel data is 0.08 and somewhat closer to 
their estimate of capital-skill complementarity. This may be attributed to differences 
in data and estimation method. I observed that data for the year 1998-99 showed large 
increases in the employment and wage shares of skilled-labour. In that year the new 
industrial classification (NIC) was first adopted for the annual survey of industries. 
The sampling design used was the one first introduced in 1997-98. A careful 
examination of the 4-digit level data revealed a large increase in the reported skill-
wage bill shares in non-electrical equipment industries. I have re-estimated the 
                                                 
18 I have estimated the equation for three-period and four-period panels with change 
in log of output and log of capital-output ratio as the single explanatory variable. Both 
are statistically significant at conventional levels   25 
 
regression after dropping the year 1998-99. My results do not change and the estimate 
of capital-skill complementarity effect is higher than that reported in Table 3
19.    
 
 
Table-3: Skill-Wage Share Regressions: Panel Data Estimates             
Estimates for 46 Three-digit Industries 
Dependent variable: Δ Share of Skilled-Labour in Wage-bill 
























Year Dummies  NO  YES  YES 
Observations 45  90  136 
R-Squared 0.02 0.328 0.289 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. (*) Significant at 
10% level. (**) Significant at 5% level. (***) Significant at 1* level. 
They are based on Huber-White standard errors robust to within panel 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Estimates for constant are not 
reported for column 2 and 3. 
 
In Table 4 the estimate of equation (3) based on 113 four-digit industries is 
presented. This set of estimates is based on three two-period panels covering the years 
1993-94 to 2004-05 with 4-year, 5-year and 10-year differences respectively. I will be 
referring to as panel-1, panel-2 and panel-3 respectively. As I noted earlier more 
                                                 
19 I estimated the first differenced model with 1981, 1990 and 2004 as panel years. 
The coefficient of log output change is 0.183 and the coefficient of capital/output ratio 
is 0.222.Both are highly significant.    26 
 
detailed data for employment is available for four-digit industries for selected years. 
The data on number of workers is further subdivided into regular workers and 
contract workers. Similarly, the data on wages and salaries paid is separately available 
for workers and non-manual employees. Data on Non-manual employees is an 
aggregate of managers, supervisors plus others not belonging to manual 
workers/supervisory positions. Consequently, the wage differential between skilled 
and unskilled labour is more accurately measured
20. In addition to output and capital-
output ratio, I have introduced contract intensity, measured as share of contract 
workers in total workers and import to output ratio as additional variables. The first is 
a measure of the impact of restrictive labour regulations (Ramaswamy 2005). 
Contract intensity is a firm level response to India’s labour market rigidity. If labour 
regulations raise the expected cost of hiring unskilled workers it should create more 
incentive for the industry to hire skilled labour who are substitutes for unskilled 
labour. The expected sign for the coefficient of contract intensity is positive. Imports-
to-output ratio is a trade variable that is a measure of import penetration whose 
expected sign is positive.  
In Table 4A two columns for each panel is separately shown. The first 
includes all the 4 variables and the second column assumes constant returns to scale 
(CRS) and thus excludes output variable. The estimated coefficient of output is 
consistently positive and significant in all three-time periods. However, capital-output 
ratio is positive but not significant in the first and third panel (column 1 and column 
5) and in the CRS specification in the second panel (column 2). The CRS 
specification in panel-2 is in fact problematic as R-square is very low and none of the 
                                                 
20 I have plotted the wage differential between workers and supervisors as well as 
workers and other non-manual employees for two selected years, namely 1998 and 
2003, for 122 four-digit industries in Figures A1 and A2 respectively in the appendix.   27 
 
estimated parameters except the constant term are significant. Import-output ratio is 
insignificant in all the three panels. In brief the widely used direct measure of 
international trade variable does not have any significant impact. The interesting 
parameter is the contract-intensity whose coefficient is positive and significant in the 
CRS specification in panel-1 and panel-3 (column 2 and column 6 of Table 4A). It is 
positive and not significant in the first and in the third panel (column 1 and column 5). 
This may be interpreted as follows. If there are costs of labour regulations and they 
are not offset by strong scale-economies then industries have an incentive to hire 
relatively more skilled labour increasing skill-wage inequality.  This is consistent with 
the reported fact that both contract-intensity and skill-intensity go up with 
employment size of factories in India (Ramaswamy, 2006).   
In Table 4B, estimate of equation (3) using the three-period panel of four-digit 
industries is presented. I have presented the parameter estimates based on First 
Differenced (FD) and Fixed Effect (FE) models for the three-period panel as they are 
alternative approaches to control unobserved industry specific heterogeneity when 
T>2
21. The estimated coefficients based on FD and FE methods are very close that 
provides greater confidence in the estimates. The estimated coefficient of capital-
output ratio is found to be similar with a value equal to 0.0027-0.0040 for the three-
period panel. This is substantially smaller than the reported estimate (0.04) of Bound 
et al (2005). As we noted earlier the parameter estimate for the US for the period 
1959-86 is 0.038 (Berman, Bound, Griliches 1994). My estimate of capital-skill 
complementarity is therefore 7 to 10 percent of US estimate. This may be interpreted 
                                                 
21 A comparison for each model between the standard OLS t-statistics and the robust 
t-statistics were also carried out. They are not presented to save space. Estimated 
coefficients do not change but the robust estimates have large standard errors and 
therefore the statistical significance of estimated coefficients differ relative to 
standard OLS t-statistics.   28 
 
as much weaker capital-skill complementarity effects in Indian manufacturing in the 
years of trade and investment liberalization and production structure upgrading. 
However, the direction of change in skill-wage share due to capital-skill 
complementarity is clearly positive. 
 
Table 4A: Skill-Wage Share Regressions: Two Period Panels 
Estimates for 113 four-digit Industries 





































































Observations  95 95 100  100  96 96 
R-squared  0.478 0.352 0.138 0.002 0.561 0.336 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. (*) Significant at 10% level. (**) 
Significant at 5% level. (***) Significant at 1* level. They are based on Huber-White 
standard errors robust to within panel serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 4B: Skill-Wage Regressions: Three Period Panel (1993-2004) 
Comparison of First Differenced and Fixed Effect Estimates 
Dependent variable: Share of Skilled-Labour in Wage-bill 
  First Differenced (FD)  Fixed Effect (FE) 































Observations  195 195 310 310 
R-squared  0.411 0.268 0.481 0.300 
Year Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level.(**) 
significant at 5% level.(***) significant at 1* level. They are based on Huber-White 
standard errors robust to within panel serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
 
A final set of estimate comparison is presented in Table 4C that further support the 
robustness of my results. Here I compare the FD and FE estimates with and without 
year dummies. It may be argued that additional inclusion of time dummy may not be 
required as long as the included variable (output) is picking up the time-varying 
effects. Note that the regression estimates in Table 4C (column1 and column 3) 
contain both output as well as year dummies. In columns 2 and 4 the estimates are 
shown after dropping the year dummies. In the FD model one can immediately notice 
that the statistical significance of capital-output ration and contract-intensity improves 
relative to estimates with time dummies. Output, capital-output ratio and contract 
intensity are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels (Column 3). 
The FE model results do not show much change. This is supportive of the positive   30 
 
impact of capital-skill complementarity and contract-intensity on skill-wage 
inequality in Indian manufacturing.    
 
Table 4C: Skill-Wage Regressions: Three Period Panel (1993-2004) 
Comparison of First Differenced and Fixed Effect Estimates 
Dependent variable: Share of Skilled-Labour in Wage-bill 
  First Differenced (FD)  Fixed Effect (FE) 
































Observations  195 195 310  310 
R-squared  0.411 0.394 0.481  0.466 
Year Dummies  YES NO  YES  NO 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. (*) Significant at 10% level. (**) 
Significant at 5% level. (***) Significant at 1* level. They are based on Huber-White 
standard errors robust to within panel serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
 
V Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour is one important component of 
income inequality. This paper examined the question of wage inequality in Indian 
manufacturing in the years of trade and investment liberalization. A first look at the 
aggregate data suggested an increase in relative employment and relative wages of 
skilled-labour in the 1990s continuing up to 2004-05, compared to the trend in the 
1980s. This fact suggested that shift in aggregate demand in favour of skilled-labour 
is responsible for the increase in wage inequality. An examination of changes in FDI   31 
 
inflow into manufacturing, share of imported capital goods in fixed capital formation 
and changes in capital-output ratio, the key sources of technological change, clearly 
indicated that these were the years of upgrading production structure in Indian 
manufacturing. I estimated the wage share equation based on translog variable cost 
function to test the hypothesis of capital-skill complementarity and skill-biased 
technological change. The skill-wage share equation is estimated for a panel of 46 
three-digit industries spanning the period 1981-2004.followed by 113 four-digit 
industries panel covering the period 1993 to 2004.The coefficient of change in the log 
of output (scale effect) is estimated to be positive and highly significant. This suggests 
that in Indian manufacturing skilled/unskilled labour ratio is not invariant to scale of 
output. Contract-worker intensity of production worker is found to positively impact 
skill-wage shares. This is interpreted to suggest that restrictive domestic labour 
regulations applied to manual workers encourages greater skilled-labour demand. The 
estimates of coefficient of log change in capital-output ratio after accounting for year 
effect and unobserved industry specific heterogeneity is found to be 0.004. This 
estimate is substantially lower than 0.038, the estimate for the US manufacturing 
industries for the 1960s and 1970s by Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994). This is 
not surprising as the extent of capital deepening in Indian manufacturing is 
substantially lower than that of the US. However, the direction of change is found to 
be clearly in favour of skill-biased labour demand towards non-manual labour in the 
years of trade openness in India. This is in line with the proposition that skill bias in 
labour demand is an endogenous response to trade openness (Acemoglu 2003). My 
results are consistent with the other studies in developing countries supporting 
hypothesis of skill-biased technological change (Pavenik 2003: Goldberg and Pavenik 
2007).    32 
 
  My results support the proposition that trade openness has changed the relative 
skill-wage by shifting out the demand for skilled labour. In another study of labour 
demand in Indian manufacturing (Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy,2007) we had found 
support for the Rodrik (1997) hypothesis that trade liberalization adversely affect 
unskilled labour by making labour demand more elastic (flatter labour demand 
curves). This puts greater pressure on unskilled labour by weakening their bargaining 
power. Taking these results together one may conclude that trade openness will not be 
a bowl of cherries for unskilled labour in Indian manufacturing. What should be the 
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Appendix B: List of 46 3-digit Industries 
151  Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit vegetables, oils and fats 
152  Dairy products 
153  Grain mill products, starches and starch products, and prepared animal feeds 
154  Other food products 
155  Beverages  
160  Tobacco products 
171  Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 
172  Other textiles   
173  Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 
181  Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 
191  Tanning and dressing of leather, luggage etc 
192  Footwear  
201  Saw milling and planing of wood 
202  Products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials 
210  Paper and paper product 
221  Publishing    
222  Printing and service activities related to printing 
241  Basic chemicals 
242  Other chemical products 
251  Rubber products 
252  Plastic products 
261  Glass and glass products 
269  Non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 
271  Basic Iron & Steel 
272  Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
281  Structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and steam generators 
289  Other fabricated metal products; metal working service activities 
291  General purpose machinery 
292  Special purpose machinery 
293  Domestic appliances, n.e.c. 
300  Office, accounting and computing machinery 
311  Electric motors, generators and transformers 
312  Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
313  Insulated wire and cable 
314  Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 
319  Other electrical equipment n.e.c. 
321  Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 
323  Television and radio receivers, sound or video recording apparatus 
331  Medical appliances and instruments and appliances  
332  Optical instruments and photographic equipment 
333  Watches and clocks 
341  Motor vehicles 
342  Bodies (coach work) for motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
351  Building and repair of ships & boats 
352  Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 
361  Manufacture of furniture   
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